In two previous PolicyBytes, we’ve outlined the problems with expecting the federal government to voluntarily surrender power to the states and to make critical fiscal reforms, especially entitlement reform. Today, we’ll explain how such a convention would work, and answer common objections.
In order to hold an Article V convention, the Constitution requires two-thirds of the states, or 34 states, to make application. That means the legislatures of 34 states pass such an application, or resolution, and submit it to Congress.
Now, two-thirds is considered a “supermajority” in our system, whereas a simple majority is 50 percent plus one. Supermajorities are required of each house of Congress to overturn a presidential veto, while a 60-vote supermajority is required to break a senate filibuster. A supermajority is a high threshold to overcome, but that’s its purpose.
But for an Article V convention to make any changes, the Constitution requires a super-duper majority of three quarters of the states, or 38 states.
In other words, only 13 states can block anything in an Article V convention, because they can simply walk out. The constitutional requirement is not three-quarters of the states present, but three-quarters of the total number of states.
Finally, and this is the real kicker, each state has only a single vote, regardless of the state’s population or number of electoral votes. In other words, California has the same power as Wyoming at an Article V convention. This reflects the Founders’ concern, which shows up many places in our political system, about large states running roughshod over smaller states.
Once you understand the constitutional requirements for an Article V convention, the objections melt away. What about the scope and topics for a convention? If thirteen states object to consideration of a particular topic, it’s out of scope. How about the rules for the convention? If thirteen states don’t like a rule, it won’t pass. The Founders’ design ensures that no changes are made to our precious Constitution unless there is very broad consensus among the states.
Which takes us to the primary objection: What prevents a “runaway convention?” In other words, what’s to stop a small number of blue states to, say, weaken the Second Amendment, or what’s to stop a small number of red states from passing an amendment outlawing abortion or something? The fear is that radical change might happen at an Article V convention that would irreparably damage the Constitution.
But now you understand why that is impossible. With each state delegation having only a single vote, and with three-quarters of the states required to do anything, the likelihood is that nothing would pass at the convention, or only a few changes that had broad, bi-partisan, pan-regional support. Nothing radical stands a chance.
June 26, 2024