The British government has plans to monitor the movements of all vehicles on roads using a national surveillance network of cameras that are able to read the license plate of every car. The system will keep records of car travel in a database for at least two years and eventually probably as long as five.
Is this an abuse of technology? Or is it a legitimate tool for law enforcement?
Technology is a two-edged sword. It offers remarkable new opportunities. Yet it can open up almost limitless possibilities for misuse. There are profound privacy and basic civil liberty concerns with the British surveillance network: Should the movements of law-abiding citizens be routinely monitored and the records retained for years?
The private sector already has a system that tracks drivers. The OnStar system, offered by General Motors, monitors car movement. But that’s a voluntary feature that consumers agree to buy. When the state monitors vehicles, there is no choice—except to choose not to drive on public roads, which isn’t much of a choice at all.
It’s conceivable—highly likely, actually—that the British car surveillance system will be a significant benefit for law enforcement. But so would forcing every person to give their DNA to the state to be put in a database.
It’s also conceivable that the public will support the British surveillance system if and when it proves to be helpful, say in finding people in an emergency, removing criminals from the streets, even in counter-terrorism.
Will critics then become more accepting as well? Or do the possible violations of privacy and freedom simply outweigh the benefits, no matter how compelling they are?
A vigorous—and lengthy—national debate should precede the implementation of such a system, which didn’t happen in Britain. The governed need to give their consent before they agree to open themselves to constant surveillance.
That debate seems to have been forgotten in Britain. It should not be bypassed here.